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Economic Origins of the Partitions1
The underlying causes of the partitions of Poland have, as we know, 
been discussed in abundant works, yet they have not arrived at a con-
sensus. The most intensely debated matter is the question of the internal 
and external causes of the collapse of Poland. The most extreme theory 
concerning the internal origins of the downfall of the erstwhile Com-
monwealth was formulated in the well-known sentence by Bobrzyński, 
who asserted that “neither the boundaries nor the neighbours, but inter-
nal disorder drove us into loss of political existence.”2 The most extreme 
counterclaim came from Balzer, who opposed this theory vehemently, 
stating that “the view according to which the deficiencies of our system 
were allegedly the major cause of the decline of Poland proved errone-
ous,” as “the actual, decisive reason behind the collapse of our state-
hood, the crucial causa efficiens of that event is the covetousness of 
1 Translated from: J. Rutkowski, Gospodarcze podłoże rozbiorów Polski, “Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 1930, 1, pp. 236–245 by Szymon Nowak and proofread by 
Stephen Dersley. The translation and proofreading were financed by the Ministry of Sci-
ence and Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018. This paper is an abridged version of 
the lecture given in Poznań in 1926. In view of the limited space, half of the original text 
and all notes had to be removed. I hope that despite those deletions the essential course of 
the disquisition has not lost its clarity. As far as circumstances allow, I shall substantiate the 
views expressed here more extensively elsewhere, in particular those which at first glance 
may appear insufficiently supported due to the aforesaid deletions. 
2 M. Bobrzyński, Dzieje Polski w zarysie II, Kraków 1890, p. 348.
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the united and therefore superiorly potent neighbours, who conspired to 
bring about the doom of Poland.”3
The first of the views cited above would suggest that the direct cause 
of the annihilation of the Polish state was not the incursion of external 
foes, but an internal breakdown that the neighbours readily exploited. 
Meanwhile, the arrangement of social and state structures—not only un-
der Stanisław August when it witnessed thorough reorganization and re-
vival, but also in the Saxon period—managed quite satisfactorily, given 
the times, to meet the needs of the society with respect to safety, the 
judiciary and other internal affairs of the state. 
Admittedly, certain destructive forces were there, particularly in the 
East, but confronted with the strength of the State they were so weak 
that in themselves they would not have brought about its collapse. The 
Bar Confederation cannot be considered such an internal breakdown, 
since confederations against the Crown had been formed quite often 
well over a century prior to the first partition. They had weakened the 
state structure, but did not led to its collapse. 
The partitions of the Commonwealth are first and foremost a page in 
the diplomatic history of the states which participated in it, and a page 
in the history of the armed forces of those states which enforced the 
occupation. The entire deliberations on the causes of Poland’s collapse 
should set out from the facts which are “external” to its history and con-
stitute the direct cause behind the downfall of the old Commonwealth. 
This does not mean, however, that the “covetousness of conspir-
ing neighbours” is a sufficient explanation for the catastrophe, and that 
Poland’s internal system was not one of the key contributing factors 
of the partitions. The state organization of the Commonwealth in the 
eighteenth century was strong enough to fulfil the internal tasks with re-
spect to its own society, but too weak to withstand the external pressure. 
The military weakness of the Commonwealth is indubitably the di-
rect internal cause of its collapse. As is known, the military strengths of 
3 O. Balzer, Z zagadnień ustrojowych Polski, Lwów 1916, pp. 73, 75.
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Poland and the neighbouring states were greatly disproportionate. From 
1717 until the first partition, the Crown and the Lithuanian forces had 
merely several thousand men all told. What could such a small army do 
against the vast numbers of the Austrian, Prussian and Russian armies? 
Therefore, conducting the partitions, especially the first one, was an un-
dertaking which entailed no risk from the military standpoint. The Com-
monwealth was in a situation which virtually provoked the neighbour to 
invade and partition a country which carelessly ignored the fact that its 
frontiers were in no way secured. 
Even the greatest physical and material effort on the Polish part 
would not have availed given an analogous effort made by the three 
neighbours, but one can hardly presume that in the eighteenth century 
those states would have embarked on partitions and that the undertaking 
would have been executed consistently and successfully if it had required 
great sacrifices, and above all, whether they would have agreed on uni-
form diplomatic and military action precisely at a moment when they 
confronted no hindrance from other states in Europe. 
In a variety of ways, Poland’s military weakness is directly and in-
directly associated with the democratic political system of the Nobles’ 
Commonwealth. One of the incentives to keep the numbers of the stand-
ing army so low, particularly in the Saxon period, was that the Sejm (na-
tional diet) feared that the king would use the armed forces to introduce 
absolute monarchy, such as those which had long been established or 
were just emerging at the time among the near and more remote neigh-
bours of Poland. Particularly during the reign of August II, who would 
return so often to the idea of imposing absolute monarchical rule, even 
at the expense of the partial partition of the Commonwealth, those fears 
were not without some serious foundations. 
However, following the death of that king the concerns subsided, 
and under August III the augmentation of the army was discussed at 
the Sejm on numerous occasions. However, until the first partition no 
serious measures were implemented, again due to internal-political rea-
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sons. With the in-fighting between the magnate houses which at the time 
held Poland’s fates in their hands, there were fears that—should the cir-
cumstances change—a larger army may boost the political significance 
of the opponents, therefore no decisive steps were taken. At any rate, 
the efforts made during the reign of August III did not reach the stage 
where the financial difficulties involved would have become evident 
and, having penetrated into the minds of the political circles, presented 
a real obstacle to building up the army. 
After the first partition, and in particular during the Four-Year Sejm, 
the appreciation of military situation considerably increased. Awareness 
of the necessity of having a large army as a foundation of an indepen-
dent political entity became more widespread, but new difficulties arose 
when the idea was to be pursued in practice, which became evident in 
the weakness of the treasury. 
Issues of a financial nature had become immediately apparent as 
early as 1775, when one began to consider enlarging the army—to the 
very modest number of 30,000 men for the time being—in more specific 
terms. With the planned military reform in mind, the preliminary rev-
enue envisaged at the beginning of the Four-Year Sejm was 18,000,000, 
but since only 13,500,000 was collected, the military budget had to be 
reduced from 12,000,000 to 6,000,000. By enacting a “perpetual con-
tribution” as a financial mainstay of the army, it was hoped that the 
tax would yield 35,000,000. However, only 9,000,000 was effectively 
levied. Conducting income assessments on a different basis, a special 
tax adjustment committee increased that revenue to 14,500,000, which 
was still below half of what had been envisaged. It was therefore nec-
essary to revise the plan for an army of 100,000 soldiers. By virtue of 
an enactment, the strength of the army was reduced to 65,000 but even 
that could not be accomplished. When Russia declared war on Poland 
in May 1792 and invaded its territory with two armies of 100,000 men, 
the Commonwealth had merely 56,000 people under arms, but not all 
of them could be fielded. 
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The weakness of the Polish exchequer at this time, which hindered the 
creation of an army that would have been strong enough to face the chal-
lenges of those times, is linked to the political organization of the Com-
monwealth on the one hand, and its economic system on the other. Ab-
solute monarchs can more readily and promptly decide to impose high 
taxes on their subjects then diets can on their voters. On the other hand, 
the rulers of Austria and Prussia found it much easier to exact money 
from the countries they had subjugated than was possible with respect to 
Poland, whose economic constitution was much feebler.
Poland’s economic weakness was particularly evident in industrial 
production, trade, and credit framework—in short in the economic orga-
nization of its towns and cities. Admittedly, Russia’s economic system 
was not more developed or stronger than Poland’s, but when comparing 
economic relationships in Poland and Russia from the standpoint of the 
ability to raise a strong military structure, we must not forget about 
the differences in population. A lower tax burden levied on a greater 
population enabled Russia to create a larger military force than was pos-
sible in Poland, where a relatively substantial portion of the social rev-
enue went to the state. 
As for the causes of the Commonwealth’s economic weakness, one 
should in the first place mention the very numerous hostile incursions 
which had ravaged the country so much since the mid-seventeenth 
century. However, it would be entirely erroneous to presume that the 
Commonwealth owed its economic deficiencies in the eighteenth cen-
tury solely to the devastations of war. There was another factor which 
adversely affected the economic system and its reconstruction after the 
ruinous wars: the economic policies adopted by the Sejm and regional 
assemblies (sejmik), which were subsequently enforced by the adminis-
trative authorities.
The Sejm and sejmik were institutions where the class interests 
of great estate owners were furthered. The differences boiled down to 
greater or lesser short-sightedness of the policies or contradictory eco-
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nomic positions adopted among the nobles themselves. On the one hand, 
there were the disparate interests of the magnates and the lower nobility 
or gentry (szlachta), and the equally incongruent interests of agrarian 
groups from different provinces across the Commonwealth. 
Within the legislative bodies, the economic programme aiming to 
concentrate the largest possible portion of the social revenue in the 
hands of the great landowners encountered no opposition. It was only 
the shortage of an adequately robust administration that caused the poli-
cies to be less far-reaching than envisioned in theory and legislation. 
The policies yielded short-term and thoroughly tangible outcomes. 
It enabled great landowners to enjoy a standard of living which, giv-
en the defeats and ravages that the country had suffered, would have 
been impossible if the development of economic relationships had relied 
on the free competition of particular strata of the society. Nevertheless, 
the high living standard—in relation to the overall production capacity 
at the time—available to owners of large estates came at a cost, weaken-
ing the economy of the Commonwealth across various domains: agri-
culture, industry, trade and taxation.
Peasant serfdom was the chief manifestation of the agrarian policies 
espoused by the nobility, enabling great landowners to effect a com-
plete economic restructuring of their estates. The peasantry of the four-
teenth and fifteenth century had in fact been minor independent agri-
cultural producers and constituted the majority of the rural population 
of Poland, but over time they were converted into labourers at manorial 
farms, as serfs or hired labour force. The interest of the manorial farms 
became the chief factor shaping relationships in agriculture. 
The impact of serfdom on economic relationships on was evinced 
most vividly and directly in the era of serfdom. Without bondage, or 
attachment to land whilst retaining peasants’ rights to it, without the om-
nipotence of the unappealable patrimonial jurisdiction, without the sub-
jects being unable to bring action against their lord in Crown courts, 
the economy based on manorial demesnes and corvée would not have 
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developed. In tenant villages serfdom was felt as well. The rents agreed 
under a voluntary contract were usually lower than the compulsory rents 
decreed for bonded peasants. This may be demonstrated by comparing 
fixed rents with the rates for the voluntary, mostly one-year leases that 
as a rule amounted to less than the usual dues of the same villages. Also, 
foreign peasants who took land under a contract paid lower rents than 
the Polish rural population who had lived there for centuries. The servi-
tude was there not only in the duties one was supposed to pay, but also 
when gainful work was undertaken. Those hired compulsorily would re-
ceive less substantial remuneration than labourers hired on a free basis. 
This constant increase of the obligatory burden of labour inevitably 
resulted in the diminishing economic independence of the peasant popu-
lation; the farmland they held was split into smaller plots while the num-
ber of small-holders and landless grew: zagrodnicy (who owned a house 
and farm buildings), chałupnicy (owned only a cottage) and komornicy 
(who had to rent a room in a farmhouse). This gradually diminishing 
economic independence meant that revenue from land estates soared, 
whereas the former prosperity of the peasants dwindled. 
Experience teaches us that reducing the share of agricultural workers 
in the yield of their labour, once it exceeds a certain limit, will have an 
adverse effect on production, causing it to deteriorate. Rather than with 
hired labourers, this occurs relatively faster with the serfs who are entrust-
ed with the draught animals and farm equipment to cultivate the fields of 
their landlord. Agricultural production had been on the decline since the 
seventeenth century, especially since the latter half, so that agriculture in 
the eighteenth century was in a worse state than it had been in the six-
teenth. Eighteenth-century authors attribute this decline mainly to serf-
dom, but there can be no doubt that the military defeats sustained in the 
mid-seventeenth and early eighteenth century played a role. 
After all, the reduction of the area of arable land which correspond-
ed to the sparsity of population owing to warfare and the epidemics 
which followed cannot be imputed to serfdom alone. However, the latter 
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factor did contribute to the lower birth rates among the peasants caused 
by their poverty. 
It is more difficult to account for the decreased productivity of the 
grain and soil. The phenomenon may been resulted from the poorer 
quality of cultivation and agricultural technology in general, reflecting 
a shortage of financial resources due to wartime destruction and the di-
minishing efficiency of serfdom-based work. 
As for the industrial policy in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
tury, one should invariably distinguish between the policies pursued by 
the rulers and those supported by the Sejm and regional sejmiki. The 
monarch would often attempt to introduce new types of industry, es-
pecially where the branches catering to the refined needs of the upper 
classes were concerned. Meanwhile, fixing prices for ready-made craft 
products or craft work were the most important matters debated at the 
diets and local assemblies. From the perspective of the class interests of 
agricultural producers, striving for the lowest possible prices is perfectly 
understandable, as the income from their estates would enable them to 
purchase more industrial-made goods and enjoy a higher standard of 
living. 
As a result of the financial relationships at the time, there was a gen-
eral tendency for the products—agricultural and industrial alike—to 
grow more expensive. The dominant policy was to curb the increases 
in price of the latter, which it sought to achieve by two means: through 
a liberal customs policy and by dictating prices for craft work and craft 
products, which were determined in voivodeship-level tariffs. 
Although municipal authorities intervened to some extent where the 
rates were concerned, the policy is quite correctly considered a mani-
festation of the designs and goals of the nobility. Opinions are divided 
as to whether the policy was effective. There can be no doubt, however, 
that it failed to stop the price increases, although one should not—in my 
opinion—draw the conclusion that a policy of fixed rates is utterly inef-
fectual. It operated jointly with and in the same direction as the customs 
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policy, therefore studying the outcomes of either policy separately is se-
verely limited. At any rate, it is doubtless that in conjunction they man-
aged to slow down the increases of prices for craft labour and craft 
products. Price growth rate in that area was considerably lower than in 
the case of rural products. 
The consequences this entailed were very significant indeed. The no-
bles were able—ceteris paribus—to purchase more and more industrial 
products, in other words to elevate their standard of living or, at the time 
of the calamities of war and universal impoverishment, they did not need 
to reduce that standard as much as they would have had to if that price 
policy had not operated. If, by and large, a peasant was not able to do like-
wise, it was due solely to the increasing duties that nullified the positive 
effect which the price policy might have had for the peasant estate. The 
nobles benefited even more, deriving both the aforementioned direct as 
well as indirect advantages from the policy. The cost of it all was borne by 
the town-dweller, the craftsman in particular, who had to content himself 
with constantly diminishing earnings from his work. This compelled him 
to reduce his standard of living and prevented any progress in industrial 
production, which the impoverished craftsmen simply could not afford. 
This may also explain why the attempts to introduce the capitalist system 
in the field of industry seldom originated with the particular producers or 
merchant-bourgeois. It was the land-owning estate, magnates in particu-
lar, who played a key role here. It was a class that had much more substan-
tial capital at its disposal which could be invested in industrial enterprises. 
We may now return to the question of whether the treasury ailed 
because the economic system was weak or whether the potential of the 
latter was insufficiently exploited; alternatively, what role was played 
by each of those factors. It is obvious that the Polish economy, con-
spicuously weaker than the economies of our Western neighbours, pre-
vented our treasury from becoming as affluent as theirs. However, the 
fact that treasury legislation—even during the period of the Four-Year 
Sejm, when the revenue was raised to unprecedented amounts—did not 
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exhaust all possibilities, becomes evident upon comparing the history 
of the Polish exchequer in the final years of the Commonwealth with 
history of the same in the early years following the partitions. The very 
substantial increase of that revenue had already been noted by Staszic. 
Under duress, we were able to afford to maintain the armed forces of 
the partitioning states, yet we could not afford to make voluntary contri-
butions to keep an army capable of defending the independence of the 
Commonwealth. 
That phenomenon is strictly linked to the centuries-long tradi-
tion of treasury policy and legislation. During the reign of Kazimierz 
Jagiellończyk, a watershed period for both treasury and military history, 
when a regular army instead of a levy en masse became the chief instru-
ment of waging war, the nobles had to contribute a portion of their in-
come towards the regular forces, unless they took part in the war them-
selves. The concept of a tax being an equivalent of military service is 
clearly highlighted in a number of conscription universals from the first 
half of the sixteenth century, especially in their provisions regarding the 
gentry. 
However, thanks to their political consequence, the nobility at the time, 
i.e. at the turn of the modern era, gained fiscal freedom. Towards the end 
of the fifteenth century they were exempted from customs duties, while 
direct taxation became less and less important in the early sixteenth cen-
tury, only to cease after 1521. 
The fiscal freedom of the nobility endured until the first partition. 
It was only sporadically interrupted in the latter half of the seventeenth 
century and three quarters of the following century by several enact-
ments introducing capitation and general customs tax. This was the 
terrible tragedy of the development of our state—that great landown-
ers, having seized control of public affairs, directed economic policies 
in a way that delivered a vast portion of the revenue into their hands, 
at the expense of the townspeople and peasants. At the same time, they 
were unwilling to surrender an adequate part of that income which 
Economic Origins of the… | 257 
would go towards defence of the state, and thus indirectly their secu-
rity as well. 
The tax statutes enacted under Stanisław August placed an incompa-
rably greater fiscal burden on the landowning class. This applied in par-
ticular to the general customs tax, vastly increased quarter tax and the 
perpetual contribution. Very serious results thus ensued. When the reso-
lutions of the Four-Year Sejm had been promulgated, the revenue of 
the Commonwealth’s Crown treasury from a territory diminished by the 
first partition was six times larger than the analogous revenue in the Sax-
on era. It was a major effort, yet it was still too modest to save the state 
from the partitions. That the effort could have been more substantial 
was demonstrated by the Prussian tax policy after the collapse of the 
Commonwealth. Had its economy been stronger, had it not been ex-
hausted by the wars and fatigued by the economic policies described 
above, fiscal legislation, which entered into force thanks to the endeav-
ours of the Four-Year Sejm, would have yielded even more revenue, suf-
ficient to build an army exceeding even 100,000 men. However, given 
the economic situation at the time, there was a need for laws that would 
have imposed even higher levy on the income from the great estates 
for the benefit of the State, but the representatives of the landowning 
class of whom the Four-Year Sejm was composed could not bring them-
selves to do so. 
Our reasoning so far has reached a point where the various internal 
causes behind the decline of the Commonwealth become combined and 
form an inextricable nexus. The weak economy itself does not account for 
the collapse and cannot be considered its sole cause, as it would not have 
prevented the creation of a strong fiscal apparatus and a strong army, if 
a tax policy suited to the political circumstances had existed. The latter 
could have been introduced by an absolute ruler or Sejm whose members 
had higher standards of public morality and a greater capacity to sacrifice 
the interests of the estate they represented for the sake of the common 
good than was actually the case.
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The political system of the Commonwealth, with its omnipotent as-
sembly of the nobles would not have been detrimental if the economy 
had been stronger, or if at critical moments its members had demon-
strated a higher spiritual level.
The moral condition of the then community of nobles, which cannot 
be considered to have been inferior to the condition of the nobility in oth-
er countries who at each turn displayed the same economic inclinations, 
would not have contributed to the collapse if the rights of the nobility had 
been limited, that is, if its overwhelming influence had already been un-
dermined by absolute monarchy. 
It was only the concerted working of those three factors: economic 
deficiency, the political system, and the morals of the ruling estate, that 
constituted—as an integral whole—the internal cause of the partitions. 
Even so, all that taken together would not have been a sufficient reason, 
had it not been for the collusion of external factors, meaning the rapacity 
of the neighbours. 
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that neither external nor internal 
causes considered separately permit one to resolve why the partitions 
happened, just as none of the internal factors alone cannot be deemed 
to have been critically decisive. Only when combined into an entirety can 
they offer an explanation for the political disaster of the Commonwealth. 
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